Abstract
In search of democracy, local
participation in decision making was a major milestone in Ghana’s history
towards this direction. Thus, as far back as 1988, the then military government
in Ghana paved way for this process. This culminated into a Law which was
passed only a year after Ghana reverted to democracy in 1992. This law which
became known as the Local Government Law, (Act 462) encouraged the local
citizenry to effectively participate in the decisions that directly affect
their lives. Hence, the Local Government Law provided for both Ex-Ante and Ex-Post
types of accountability to be used in order to hold in check their
representatives (Assembly men and women) at the district levels. These
provisions (Ex-Ante and Ex-Post types of accountability) in the Law give hope
to the local people except that the Central Government still determines who
becomes the Metropolitan Chief Executive/Municipal Chief Executive/District
Chief Executive and subsequently appoints 30% of the staffing at the various District
Assemblies. This phenomenon inhibits total openness to the local people whom
these authorities are supposed to be accountable to. This paper is of the view
that not until there is a 100% voting pattern at the district levels in Ghana,
true democracy at the local level will continue to remain a mirage.
1.0 Introduction
Decentralization ensures that the
local populace and communities participate in the larger political process in
any nation. It therefore enhances the democratization process through
participation, transparency, empowerment and responsiveness to the local
people. Hence, public officials at the helm of affairs are often held in check
vis-à-vis their activities by the people or public officials avail themselves
of the opportunity to explain their actions to the local people to ensure
effective accountability. For Moncrieffe (2001), accountability is considered
instrumental in securing optimal performance from elected representatives and
the public department under their charge. However, securing accountability at
the local level has proven to be challenging in most developing countries such
as Ghana where institutions are still evolving. According to Ayee, the rate of
illiteracy, ignorance and poverty is extremely high, and access to information
and legal channels are virtually nonexistent (Ayee, 1996; Agyeman-Duah, 2008).
However, the failure of accountability contributes to misappropriation of
public funds and that severely affects public services. In the view of Schacter
(2000), when the state breaks its bargain with citizens – many things go wrong;
public funds may be misappropriated or stolen, public contracts and posts may
be unfairly awarded and public services may be poorly delivered or not delivered
at all, among others. Thus because the consequences of failed accountability
can be dire, it is important to understand how accountability can fail, which
in turn determines what may be done to fix it. For political scientists, an
examination of accountability should begin with the question of how to control
the exercise of power. Because the exercise of power can lead to abuses, there
is therefore the need to domesticate and control the use of power by subjecting
it to certain procedures and rules of conduct.
This paper begins by
conceptualizing the concept of accountability and in addition, gives an
overview of the forms of accountability. Furthermore, brief discussions are
done on the context of local government in Ghana, the composition of the District
Assemblies and the organizational structure of the Local Government System in
Ghana. The main theme of the paper is centred on Ex-Ante and Ex-Post types of
Accountability which are provided for, in the Local Government Law (Act 462) of
Ghana. An assessment is done by bringing out the importance and criticisms of
both the Ex-Ante and Ex-Post types of Accountability. Lastly, concluding
remarks follow shortly with some recommendations in order to help make the
Ex-Ante and Ex-Post types of Accountability more effective and responsive to
the needs of the local people in Ghana.
2.0. Conceptualizing Accountability
Accountability as Answerability
Accountability is often
associated with answerability. It involves the right to receive information by
the people and the corresponding obligation to release all necessary details to
them by officials in charge. Accountability involves explanation and
justification of actions and inactions by public officials and its
corresponding monitoring and oversight by the people. Accountability as
answerability does not exclude finding facts and generating evidence. It is
antithetical to mono-logic power. It establishes a dialogic relationship
between accountable and accounting actors. For Moncrieffe, accountability means
answerability for a person‟s actions or behaviour in the exercise of authority
(Moncrieffe, 2001; Dwivedi, 1994). Indeed, in the study of politics,
accountability is viewed as the ability to determine who in government is
responsible for a decision or action and the ability to ensure that officials
are answerable for their actions. Accountability therefore means holding
elected or appointed officials entrusted with public mandate and organizations
charged with managing public functions answerable for specific actions or
activities to the citizens from whom they derive their authority. For Trow, it
then becomes „the obligation to explain, justify, or answer questions about how
resources have been used and to what effect‟ (Trow, 1996:310).
Accountability as Enforcement
Accountability as enforcement
implies that improper behaviours by public officials are punished. Exercise of
accountability ought to expose misdeeds of public officials and impose material
consequences on them. Accountability as enforcement goes beyond the mere
informational and explanatory dimensions, in addition, it includes sanctions
for improper conduct by public officials. The tight coupling of accountability
and the availability of sanctions reflect neoinstituionalist common sense about
the conditions of effective institutions. According to much of the new institutionalist
literature, for rules to be effective they must be accompanied by mechanisms of
monitoring that prevent the eventual violation of rules from going unnoticed.
But they must also count with mechanisms of enforcement that “get the
incentives right” by keeping acts of cheating from going unpunished. Accountability therefore entails agent’s
responsibility to inform and the principal’s responsibility to demand
information about performance. Sanctions form an essential dimension of
accountability. Accountability becomes weak if it is confined to the corridors
of exposure of wrongdoing of public officeholders. It is the enforcement aspect
that gives weight to the concept. The notion that a breach of rules or
negligent of duties is punishable configures this dimension of accountability.
Actors to whom public responsibility has been entrusted would not only be
questioned for their actions and behaviours but importantly, be punished for
improper conduct and misdeeds. In the same vein, it presupposes that officers
who distinguish themselves in their services are rewarded. Apart from getting
public praises and commendations for good conduct, reward may take the form of
promotion in official positions. (Bovens, 2010: 950-953).
Accountability as Virtue
Accountability as virtue involves
transparency, clarity, responsibility, involvement, deliberation, participation
which often serves as standards for the behaviour of public actors or as a
desirable state of affairs. Accountability is seen as a desirable quality of
officials, government agencies or firms (Dubnick 2007). The notion of “being
accountable” is seen as a virtue, as a positive feature of organisations or
officials. Accountability in this very broad sense is used to positively
qualify a state of affairs or the performance of an actor. However, standards
for public accountability as a virtue will vary across a range of public
organisations, political systems, and perspectives. For O‟Connell (2005: 86),
for example, accountability is present when public services are high quality,
low cost and are performed in a courteous manner. Considine, an Australian
scholar, equates accountability with responsibility and responsiveness, but in
the very broad sense of „the appropriate exercise of a navigational competence:
that is, the proper use of authority to range freely, across a
multi-relationship terrain in search of the most advantageous path to success‟
(Considine 2002: 22). In the case of hived-off semi-independent agencies,
„being accountable might even be widened to mean providing some things that
were not asked for, or for which there were not yet targets and for which no
indicator had been identified‟ (2002: 29).
(Koppell 2005), who is very much aware of the multiplicity in the usage
of the concept, distinguishes no fewer than five different dimensions to
establish accountability as a virtue – transparency, liability,
controllability, responsibility, and responsiveness.
Accountability therefore is
conceptualized in this paper as a relationship based on the provision of
information about performance „from those who have it (public officials) to
those who have a right to it (the citizenry), because they (the citizenry) have
the power to reward, sanction and the right to know‟.
3.0. Forms of Accountability
First is the Ex-ante type of
accountability. Ex-ante form of accountability is based on the concept of
representation. As O‟Connell observed, „representation entails accountability,
somehow representatives are held “liable” for their actions‟ (O‟Connell, 1996:100).
The Ex-ante type works on the principle that in order to act effectively in the
interest of the citizens, public officeholders must know what the interest of
the people is and act to satisfy that interest (Moncrieffe, 2001:27). Though
interest vaguely defined, representatives fulfilling their obligation to
provide basic social amenities and the welfare of the people are enough to
qualify the interest of the people. The citizenry then hold in check the
process and accomplishment of these interests by their representatives. Hence,
citizens‟ rights especially right to information and freedom are guaranteed in
order to help them monitor the performance of their representatives.
Second is the Ex-post
accountability which refers to recourse to the law and other monitoring and
sanctioning mechanisms especially through elections as a means of holding
elected officials to account. This often occurs in representative democracies
where citizens hold judgment over their representative through periodic elections.
This serves as the means through which an unsatisfactory conduct or behavior of
an elected official is rejected and replaced with favourable alternatives
(Moncrieffe, 2001:33). It is assumed that by compelling representatives to
answer for their past actions via elections, they will be more obliged to
fulfill their present responsibilities.
Third is horizontal form of
accountability. The horizontal type runs across a network of relatively
autonomous powers – institutions that can call into question, and
conventionally punish improper ways of discharging the responsibilities of
public officials (O‟Connell, 1996:100). It describes a relationship between
equals in which somebody or an institution of equal power checks the activities
of other agents of government (Schedler, 1999: 23). The effectiveness of
horizontal accountability is largely a function of the autonomy of the
monitoring agencies or institutions. This means that the “agencies of
restraint” must be “legally enabled and empowered” to enforce compliance with
the rules (Schedler, 1999). Thus because of widespread weaknesses of state
institutions in most developing democracies, horizontal accountability ought to
be buttressed by strong vertical accountability.
Last is the vertical type of
accountability. According to Schedler (1999), vertical accountability describes
a relationship between „unequals‟ – a powerful (superior) actor holding some
less powerful (inferior) actor responsible. In a well functioning democracy,
the government is subject to citizens‟ controls. It therefore includes
citizens‟ checks enforced through the electoral process or indirectly via civic
organizations (civil society) or the news media (Schacter, 2000:4).
4.0. The context of Local Government in Ghana – A Brief Historical
Background
The transfer of power from the
centre to the periphery (sub-national units) has been a feature of Ghana’s
decentralization and democratic governance since independence. The essential
notion is that inhabitants of a given area have the right and responsibility to
make decisions on those issues that affect them most (IDEA, 2001:11). This
allows for a more direct form of democracy in which the voices of ordinary
people can be heard more easily. This in turn fosters good government and promotes
social capital – trust, social networking and reciprocity (Putman, 1993). In the late1980’s, before Ghana officially
reverted to democracy in 1992, there were political reforms that were meant to
empower the ordinary citizens to participate in the decision making process in
Ghana. As a result, the military government at that time, the Provisional
National Defense Council (PNDC) created what became known as „revolutionary
organs‟ comprising People’s Defense Committees (PDCs) and Workers Defense
Committees (WDCs) with a mandate to make decisions in the communities and
work-places respectively. Whereas the WDCs were organized in the urban
„industrialized‟ areas to take an active part in decision making at the state
organizations, the PDCs operated at the rural level to link the regime with the
grassroots. Eventually, they became the cadres that implemented the „socialist‟
policies of the PNDC (Ayee, 1994:106). These organs later turned out to be
corrupt and deviated from the core mandate for which they were created. As a
result, the central government was pressured by domestic forces and their
Western collaborators to revert to democracy. Hence in 1988, PNDC Law 207 was
promulgated to give meaning to the District Assemblies (DAs) as a first step
towards democratization. The transition
to multiparty rule was heavily influenced by the philosophies of the PNDC
government. For instance, Chapter 20 of the 1992 Constitution titled,
„Decentralization and Local Government‟ and the Local Government Act 1993, Act
462 are a reproduction of the PNDC Law 207 that gave birth to the DAs in
1988.
The New District Assemblies (DAs)
Article 240 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana created the current District
Assemblies (DAs) in Ghana. An Act was promulgated which became known as “The
Local Government Law, 1993 (Act 462)” made DAs the highest political authority
in the district. This Law outlined the following as functions of the District
Assemblies (DAs); The DAs exercise deliberative, legislative and executive
powers at the District level. The DAs were designated development and
decision making bodies to give meaning to popular participation at the local
level. The DAs were mandated to
provide guidance, give direction to, and supervise all other administrative
authorities in the district; The Law also required of them to formulate and
execute plans, programmes and strategies for the effective mobilization of
resources necessary for the overall development of the districts. But the ability of the DAs to perform these
functions – translate the popular wishes into reality largely depends on the
amount of autonomy they possess. Hence arrangements exist in the law for the
transfer of not only financial resources but also power from the central
government to a mixture of elected and appointed local representatives of the
people.
Structure and Composition of the District Assemblies (DAs)
The Local Government Law, Act 462 designates
three categories of DAs, namely Metropolitan which covers a population of
250,000 and above; A Municipal with a population of 95,000 and above; and a
District whose population is 75,000 inhabitants. The Metropolitan, Municipal and District
Assemblies are divided into sub units in order to enhance effective local
participation in decision making: For instance, the Metropolitan Assemblies are
divided into Sub-Metropolitan District Councils, Town and Unit Committees
(UCs); and the Municipal and District Assemblies are sub-divided into Zonal,
Urban/Area Councils and UCs respectively.
The District Chief Executive (DCE) is the executive head on the
hierarchical structure of the District Assembly – he/she is an appointee of the
President of the Republic of Ghana representing the central government at the
local level. The DCE is the chairman of the Executive Committee (EC) of the
District Assembly (DA), and presides over its meetings. He is responsible for
the day-to-day performance of the executive and administrative functions of the
DA, including supervising all decentralized departments in the district (Local
Government Act (462), 1993: 18). There is also a non-partisan organized
election to elect representatives from each electoral area in the district to
represent who occupy a pivotal place in the DAs. These representatives are
called Assembly Men and Women. These elected members constitute 70% of the
membership of the DAs. The other 30% members of the DAs are chosen by the
President after further consultations had been held with the existing
traditional authorities and other identifiable interest groups in the district.
The justification for the appointment of 30% of the membership of the DA is
that, it allows for persons with expertise in several fields to be appointed to
strengthen the capacity of the DAs. Experienced and retired bureaucrats with particular
competencies in administration, accounting, education, engineering, among
others, would place their expertise at the disposal of the DAs in order to
advance the course of local governance. Similarly, the interest of
disadvantaged minorities and special groups could be considered in the
appointment process. The Member of
Parliament (MP) from the constituencies that fall within the area of authority
of a DA is one of the key figures of the DA. However, the MP is an ex-officio
member and only partakes in the decision making process at the DA but does not
vote on decisions at the Assembly. (Local Government Act (462), 1993:5-7).
Organizational Structure of the Local Government System in Ghana.
The Republic of Ghana is a
unitary state divided into ten administrative regions. Each of the regions is
headed by a Regional Minister appointed by the President. The principal units
of Local Government are the District Assemblies (DA) – that is the
Metropolitan, the Municipal and the District, of which there are One Hundred
and Seventy (170) across board in Ghana. The Metropolitan Assemblies are Six
(6), the Municipal Assemblies are Forty (40), and the District Assemblies are
One Hundred and Twenty Four (124). Between the District Assemblies and the
Central Government are the Regional Coordinating Councils (RCC‟s). The RCC‟s
are made up of the representatives from each of the District Assemblies in the
region and from the Regional House of Chiefs. The role of these bodies is to
coordinate policy implementation amongst the District Assemblies. In addition
to the above, there are sub-district level structures. These do not have any
legislative powers. They function on the basis of powers delegated to them by
the District Assemblies. The Metropolitan Assemblies are divided into Sub
Metropolitan District Assemblies. The Municipal Assemblies are also subdivided
into Town/Area/Zonal Councils and the District Assemblies are subdivided into
Unit Committees. (Country Profile: Ghana-the local government system). The
District Assemblies may delegate any of their functions excluding the power to
legislate, to sub-metropolitan district assemblies, town/area/zonal or unit
committees. These sub-district structures are designed to enhance and extend
scope for citizens‟ participation in the democratic process.
5.0. The Ex-Ante Accountability in the District Assemblies (DAs)
Accountability Ex-Ante means that
elected representatives ought to avail themselves to the electorate through
frequent interaction, consultation, mobilization of local opinions/demands,
among others (Moncrieffe, 2001:31). The Local Government Act of Ghana, Act 462
that created the DAs provided for Ex-ante accountability; First, Article 16 (1) (a) stipulates that: A
member of a DA shall … maintain close contact with his electoral area, consult
his people on issues to be discussed in the DA and collate their views,
opinions and proposals (Local Government Act (462), 1993: 16). Second, the
assembly member is further expected to present the views of the people to the DA;
and Third, the assembly member must meet the electorate before any scheduled
meeting of a DA. The requirement for the
assembly member to organize regular meetings, hold consultation with the
electorate and collate joint opinions is paramount for the survival of the
local government system that is pivoted on participatory democracy. The legal
proviso seeks to enforce compliance of the duties of the assembly member to the
electorate, thereby minimizing any possible abuse of power and authority of the
elected (Dwivedi, 1994:54). The periodic
interactions of the local representative with the electorate in his/her
community has the prospects for building confidence in the people’s
representative and the system from which he derives his authority and this process
enhances massive popular participation in the local decision making.
6.0. The Ex-Post Accountability in the District Assemblies
Ex-post accountability is the
type of accountability leaders owe to their followers, public officials to
taxpayers, and political officeholders to the electorate. Conventionally, it is
secured through a system of election campaigns, and elections that result in
making officials/representatives more accountable to the people/electorates
(Gyimah-Boadi, 2004:6). The Local Government
Act provides for a framework for holding elected local representatives
answerable for their conduct to the electorate. First, the law empowers the
electorate to revoke the mandate of their assembly member on any of the flowing
grounds: First, when the assembly
members canvass support or contest election to the DA on a political party’s
platform (because local government election in Ghana is a nonpartisan contest);
and Second, if they absent themselves
from more than three consecutive ordinary meetings of the Assembly without a
written permission from the Presiding Member of the Assembly (Local Government
Act of the Republic of Ghana, 1993:11).
The district level elections are held every four years and that represent
the most legitimate and practical means of holding the assembly members to
account for what they have done during their period in office. The local
campaign platforms were occasions for representatives to justify their actions.
The elections and bye-elections indicated to the assembly members that their
powers were limited by the people’s voting decisions at the polls.
7.0. Importance of Accountability (both ex-ante and ex-post) in Ghana’s
District Assemblies.
To begin with, accountability at
the district levels in Ghana provides legitimacy to public officials (Assembly
Members) and the District Assemblies themselves. This is because the exercise
of public authority is not taken for granted. This further strengthens public
trust in government in that public accountability, in the sense of transparent,
responsive, and responsible governance, is meant to assure public confidence in
government and to bridge the gap between citizens and representatives and
between the governed and government (Aucoin and Heintzman 2000: 49–52). In addition, accountability at the district
levels serve as a tool of inducing reflection and learning through the process
of feedback mechanisms that occur between the governors (Representatives
Assembly Members) and the governed (the local people). This goes a long way to
keep governments, agencies and individual officials effective in delivering on
their promises. Accountability induces the executive branch to learn and to
improve its performance, because it provides external feedback about the
intended and unintended effects of its policies (Aucoin and Heintzman 2000:
52–54). The possibility of sanctions from clients and other stakeholders in
their environment in the event of errors and shortcomings motivates them to
search for more intelligent ways of organizing their business. Moreover, the
public nature of the accountability process teaches others in similar positions
what is expected of them, what works and what does not.
Furthermore, it also enhances
consultation between the district and the local people. The platform of
consultation also enables the populace to check the trustworthiness of the
assembly member’s stewardship, and behaviour with procedural regularity, and
above all, his ability or willingness to exercise community reflective judgment
about matters of common concern (Gregory, 2007:342).
Added to the above is that
accountability is an important mechanism to prevent and detect corruption and
the abuse of public powers. Accountability forums provide for checks and
balances that operate independently from the political process. Good governance
arises from a dynamic equilibrium between the various powers of – and
increasingly beyond – the state (Braithwaite 1997).
Also, accountability encourages
participation and brings about transparency. The Ex-ante accountability
provides for participation for the grassroots people as there is enough social
forum for the local citizenry to offer their suggestions. The process also
allows for openness in the activities and functions of the assembly members.
This allows for checks on the functions of the assembly members and that
reduces abuse of power.
Lastly, accountability at the
district level is essential for the democratic process, because
accountabilities ex-ante and ex-post provide avenues that give the Assembly
Members and the voters with the information needed for judging the propriety
and effectiveness of the conduct of the entire District Assembly and even the
central government (Przeworski et al. 1999).
8.0. Demerits and Critique of Accountability (Ex-post and Ex-ante) in
Ghana’s District Assemblies.
First, the process of holding
representatives (Assembly Members) accountable (both ex-ante and ex-post) as
provided by the Local Government Law of Ghana, Act 462 is cumbersome. The
process of accountability in the Act follows a detailed and complex procedural
approach for the masses in holding the local representatives to check; these
are; (i) For the purpose of revoking the mandate of an elected member of a DA,
25% or more of registered voters in the electoral area may petition the
Electoral Commission (EC) for the member’s recall from the Assembly. (ii) On
receipt of the petition, the EC would proceed to organize a referendum to
decide the issue whether or not such member must be recalled. (iii) The issue
of the referendum is decided by at least, forty (40%) of the registered voters
in the electoral area, and sixty percent (60%) of the valid votes cast are
required to effect the member’s recall (Local Government Law-Act 462, 1993:12).
Because of the cumbersome legal procedure one has to go through to remove a
non-performing Assembly Member, the electorates have shunned the use of recall
and signing of petitions to remove their local leaders. The non-application of
these tools to discipline local leaders mean that non-performing assembly
members continue to remain in office for the four-year period before being
removed by the ballot box.
Second, a major factor that
undermines accountability both ex-ante and ex-post in the District Assemblies
is that the appointed Members (30%) of the DAs always demonstrate total loyalty
to the President through the District Chief Executive rather than to the local
people. This means that the people cannot sanction these appointed members at
the various District Assemblies. Since the appointments were made by the
President, revocation of such appointments also rest with him. The practice
where elected members are sanctioned by the electorate and the appointed
members are disciplined by the President makes mockery of the notion of
accountability as the cornerstone of the District Assemblies. This clearly
shows that accountability (both ex-ante and ex-post) of the local
representatives to the electorate is weak because part of the Assembly Members
is controlled by powerful central political forces.
Third, another major challenge of
accountability at the district level is lack of adequate information. Effective
oversight requires open flow of information and citizens‟ access to it, so that
the local citizens monitoring their leader can discover facts and mobilize
evidence against the representatives (Diamond, 2005:8). Sustainability of
accountability largely depends on citizens‟ access to information by which they
are able to scrutinize and impose appropriate punishments on their
representatives. Vibrant media, free flow of information and independent
appraisal mechanisms would further strengthen the citizens‟ watchdog role
(Diamond 2005). But incumbents‟ electoral manipulations, curtailment of
information flow through media censorship and corruption in high places and
maladministration of justice may possibly thwart the citizens‟ ability to
enforce accountability (Mozaffar, 2002).
Fourth, education is a sine qua non for
insightful submissions of alternative proposals for the development of the
local districts. Unfortunately, majority of the constituents (the local people)
cannot read and write and thus, makes offering constructive suggestions
virtually impossible. In addition, it is difficult for the local citizenry to
comprehend policy issues when they are being explained to them. This makes
accountability ex-ante difficult at the district levels.
Lastly, widespread corruption and
subtle curtailment of citizens‟ rights and freedoms that are gradually becoming
a feature of post-democratization politics of Africa and elsewhere are
poisonous to accountability Ex-ante (Diamond, 2005).
9.0. Conclusion and Recommendations
Representative democracy requires
that leaders act on behalf of the larger populace unlike as it used to be in
the Greek City States where direct democracy was practiced. These
representative leaders are not supposed to act capriciously, but in concert
with the laid down rules and regulations, and in this case, the supreme law of
the land. What is important is that the supreme law encapsulates the desires,
wishes and aspirations of the larger masses and that, representatives are
expected to act in tandem with this vision. Hence, it is in order for leaders
to explain their actions to the people from whom they derived their power from,
or the people hold them in check to make sure their (the citizens) aspirations
are met. The Local Government Law of Ghana (Act 462) clearly provides the
opportunity of accountabilities both ex-ante and ex-post. This gives the local
people the clout to believe that their wishes as enshrined in the Law is
protected and adhered to. However, the Local Government Law (Act 462) is not
without some grey areas and with key attention to them, the Law could be better
placed to help the masses realize their full ambitions; One area that ought to
be reviewed in the Local Government Law is the 30% appointment by the president
to the various District Assemblies. This mars the much touted
democracy at the local level. This process betrays the loyalty of the people
since those who have been appointed are always loyal to the appointed authority
other than the local people. It is firmly believed that not until the people
elect all the assembly members including the District Chief Executive, true
democracy and openness cannot be seen at the grassroots level. This is the call
of this paper.
References
Agyeman-Dua B (2008). “Fifty
Years in Perspective”, in B. Agyeman- Dua (ed) Ghana: Governance in the 4th
Republic. Accra; CDD pp. 1-31.
Ayee JRA (1996). The Measurement
of Decentralization: The Ghanaian Experience, 1988-92. African Affairs 95(31-50).
Aucoin P, and Ralph H (2000). The
Dialectics of Accountability for Performance in Public Management Reform. International Review of Administrative
Sciences, 66, pp. 45–55.
Bovens, M (2010). Two Concepts of
Accountability: Accountability as a Virtue and as a Mechanism. West European Politics, 33: 5, pp. 950 —
953.
Considine, M (2002). “The End of
the Line? Accountable Governance” in the Age of Networks, Partnerships, and
Joined-up Services Governance, 15:1, 21–40 in Deutsch, Karl W. (1963). The Nerves of Government. New York: Free
Press.
Country Profile: Ghana – The
Local Government System in Ghana accessed at www.clgf.org.uk/country-profiles/
on 25/02/2013.
Diamond R (2005). Democracy,
Development and Good Governance: the Inseparable Links. Accra; Centre for Democratic
Development pp. 4-15.
Dwivedi OP (1994). Development
Administration: From Underdevelopment to Sustainable Development. N. Y; St Martins Press pp. 12-23.
Gregory R (2007). “Accountability
in Modern Government”, in BG Peters and J Pierre (eds.) Handbook of Public Administration. London; Sage pp. 339-350.
Gyimah-Boadi E (2004). “Africa:
The Quality of Political Reform‟, in E. Gyimah-Boadi (ed.) Democratic Reform in
Africa: the Quality of Progress Boulder, Co.:
Lynne Reinner pp. 3 -15.
IDEA (2001). Democracy at the
Local Level: The International IDEA Handbook on Participation, Representation,
Conflict management and Governance. Stockholm, IDEA pp. 718.
Koppell, Jonathan G.S. (2005). “Pathologies
of Accountability: ICANN and the Challenge of Multiple Accountabilities
Disorder”, Public Administration Review, 65:1. pp. 94–107. Luhmann, Niklas
(1966). Theorie der Verwaltungswissenschaft: Bestandsaufnahme und Entwurf
Moncrieffe JM (2001). Accountability:
Ideas, Ideals, Constraints, Democratization. Volume 8 Number 3, pp. 26-50.
Mozaffar S (2002). Patterns of
Electoral Governance in Africa's Emerging Democracies. International Political Science Review Volume 23 Number 1. pp.
85-101.
O‟Connell, Lenahan (2005). Program
Accountability as an Emergent Property: The Role of Stakeholders in a Program’s
Field. Public Administration Review,
65:1, 85–93.
Przeworski, Adam, Susan C.
Stokes, and Bernard Manin, eds. (1999). Democracy, Accountability, and
Representation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Putman RD (1993). Making
Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton, NJ; Princeton University Press.
Republic of Ghana (1988). Local
government Law (PNDC Law 207). Tema; Ghana
Publishing Corporation pp. 3-7.
Republic of Ghana (1993). Local
Government Act, 1993 (Act 462). Tema; Ghana
Publishing Corporation pp. 5-45.
Schacter M (2000). When
Accountability Fails: A Framework for Diagnosis and Action‟. Policy Brief No. 9
May. Institute on Governance, Ottawa, Canada pp. 3-9.
Schedler A, Diamond L, Plattner
MF (1999a). “Conceptualizing Accountability”, in A. Schedler et al. (eds) The
Self Restraining State, Power and Accountability in New Democracies. London;
Lynne Rienner pp. 13-29.
Schedler A, Diamond L, Plattner
MF (1999b). “Restraining the State: Conflicts and Agents of Accountability”, in
A. Schedler et. al (eds.) The Self-Restraining State, Power and Accountability
in New Democracies. London; Lynne Rienner pp. 333-350.
Trow M (1996). Trust, Markets and
Accountability in Higher Education: A Comparative Perspective. Higher Education
Policy 9(4): 309-324.
